© 2004 by British Computer Society
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Combining Encryption and Proof of Knowledge in the Random Oracle Model
NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, 1-1 Hikarino-oka, Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa, 239-0847, Japan
This paper proposes a generic construction that yields encryption schemes that are secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. In particular, we focus on combining weak encryption schemes with proofs of knowledge made non-interactive through the use of a hash function. This type of conversion yields encryption schemes that allow anybody to verify the integrity of the ciphertexts. A typical example is a combination of ElGamal encryption with the Schnorr proof of knowledge, but a straightforward combination requires a stronger assumption than the random oracle assumption to prove the security. We first generalize a class of encryption schemes and proofs of knowledge to key-encapsulation schemes and signature schemes, and then present a secure way of combining them so that the security of the resulting scheme can be proven solely in the random oracle model.
Received 2 July 2002. Revised 1 July 2003.