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The Computer Journal Advance Access originally published online on November 29, 2005
The Computer Journal 2006 49(3):322-330; doi:10.1093/comjnl/bxh153
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Computer Society. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Deterministic Identity-Based Signatures for Partial Aggregation

Javier Herranz

INRIA Futurs, Laboratoire d'Informatique, École Polytechnique 91128 Palaiseau cedex, France

Email: herranz{at}lix.polytechnique.fr

Aggregate signatures are a useful primitive which allows aggregation into a single and constant-length signature many signatures on different messages computed by different users. Specific proposals of aggregate signature schemes exist only for PKI-based scenarios. For identity-based scenarios, where public keys of the users are directly derived from their identities, the signature schemes proposed up to now do not seem to allow constant-length aggregation. We provide an intermediate solution to this problem, by designing a new identity-based signature scheme which allows aggregation when the signatures to be aggregated come all from the same signer. The new scheme is deterministic and enjoys some better properties than the previous proposals; for example, it allows detection of a possible corruption of the master entity. We formally prove that the scheme is unforgeable, in the random oracle model, assuming that the Computational Diffie–Hellman problem is hard to solve.

Key Words: identity-based cryptography • aggregate signatures • provable security


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